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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—The Supreme Court Takes a Fractured Stance
on What Students Can Say About Drugs; Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618
(2007).
Kellie Nelson*

INTRODUCTION
One student’s publicity stunt lead to the Supreme Court restricting what
students all over the United States may legally say about drugs.1 It all began when
Juneau-Douglas High School released its students to attend the Olympic torch
relay as it passed in front of the school.2 As the Olympic torch (and television
cameras) approached, a group of students, including Joseph Frederick, raised a
fourteen-foot banner that read, “BONG HiTs 4 JESUS.”3 When the high school
principal, Deborah Morse, saw this banner, she crossed the street and asked the
students to lower it.4 Frederick was the only student who refused.5 Principal Morse
conﬁscated the banner and later suspended Frederick for ten days.6 Morse explained
to Frederick that she conﬁscated the banner because it promoted illegal drug use,
in violation of school board policy.7 Frederick administratively appealed to the
Juneau School District Superintendent, who upheld Frederick’s suspension, but
limited his punishment to time served.8 Like Principal Morse, the Superintendent
determined the message promoted the use of illegal substances, and thus violated
school board policy.9 The Juneau School District Board of Education upheld the
Superintendent’s decision.10
Frederick then ﬁled a suit in United States District Court for the District of
Alaska, alleging that Morse and the school board violated his First Amendment
rights by removing his banner and punishing him for displaying the banner.11 The

*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009.
1

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).

2

Id. at 2622.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.

7

Id. at 2622-23.

8

Id. at 2623. Frederick had already served eight days of his suspension. Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-0008 CV (D.Alaska May 27, 2003). Frederick ﬁled suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
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district court granted summary judgment in favor of the principal and the school
board, ruling that Morse was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity and that neither
Morse nor the school board violated Frederick’s First Amendment rights.12 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision, ﬁnding that Principal Morse violated Frederick’s right to free speech.13
The Ninth Circuit also held that Morse was not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity
because the law on student speech was clear and Morse violated it.14 Because she
was not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity, the Ninth Circuit held Morse personally
liable for monetary damages due to her violation of Frederick’s rights.15
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that,
“schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that
can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”16 Under this ruling,
Principal Morse did not violate Frederick’s right to free speech.17 Thus, the Court
did not address the qualiﬁed immunity issue.18
This case note discusses student speech jurisprudence as it stood before the
decision in Morse.19 This discussion focuses primarily on three United States
Supreme Court cases referred to as the Tinker trilogy.20 The note also provides
some background information on speech that advocates illegal conduct and the
doctrine of qualiﬁed immunity.21 The note then summarizes the ﬁve separate
opinions issued in Morse and how the Justices reached the conclusion that school
administrators can restrict student speech advocating drug use.22 This note
contends that the Court made the area of student speech more confusing by
issuing ﬁve different opinions.23 It also argues the Court should not have allowed
a viewpoint-based restriction of speech.24 Finally, this note expresses concern that
12

Frederick, No. J 02-0008 CV slip op. at 25.

13

Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004).

14

Id. In order to be covered by qualiﬁed immunity, a public ofﬁcial must show, among other
things, that the constitutional right was not clearly established at the time the public ofﬁcial violated
it. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); for further explanation of qualiﬁed immunity
see also infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
15

Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1123.

16

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 2624.

19

See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text.

20

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text.
21

See infra notes 110-123 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 129-218 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 223-1241 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 242-251 and accompanying text.
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this decision could lead to further restrictions on both student speech and speech
in other contexts.25

BACKGROUND
Since the Court focused primarily on whether Frederick’s banner constituted
protected speech under the First Amendment, this Background section focuses
primarily on student speech as embodied by Supreme Court cases known as the
Tinker trilogy.26 However, since drugs are illegal, the background section also
covers how the First Amendment applies to advocacy of illegal activity.27 Finally,
the background section addresses the doctrine of qualiﬁed immunity, which
Principal Morse raised as a defense in this case.28

Student Speech and the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.”29 At ﬁrst
glance, this amendment looks like an absolute shield against government action
that would limit freedom of expression.30 However, the Supreme Court has never
interpreted the First Amendment so absolutely.31 Rather, the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld certain limitations on expression based on the potential effects
of the speech.32 In particular, the Supreme Court has afforded student speech less
protection than adult speech under the First Amendment.33 A trilogy of cases,
often referred to as the Tinker trilogy, formed the basis of student speech law prior
to the holding in Morse.34

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
The Supreme Court ﬁrst recognized students’ First Amendment rights to
free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.35 In
25

See infra notes 252-255 and accompanying text.

26

See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Fraser, 478 U.S.
675;Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
27

See infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.

28

See infra notes 117-128 and accompanying text.

29

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 214 (CQ Press 2004).
30

FOR A

CHANGING AMERICA:

31

Id. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (holding speech is not an
unlimited right); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (establishing words that pose a
clear and present danger can be limited).
32

See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 503; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.

33

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.

34

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.

35

Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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December of 1965, a group of students and adults in Des Moines, Iowa decided
to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.36 When the Des Moines
public school principals heard about the students’ plan to wear black armbands to
school, they met and adopted a policy.37 According to the policy, faculty members
would ﬁrst ask student wearing black armbands to remove them.38 The schools
would then suspend any student who refused to remove the armband until he
or she returned without it.39 John Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and Mary
Beth Tinker all wore black armbands to school.40 They refused to remove the
armbands when asked, and, in accordance with the school board policy, they were
all suspended.41
The Supreme Court held the Constitution did not allow school ofﬁcials
to deny students this form of expression.42 The Court began by explaining that
students and teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”43 However, the Court tempered this ruling
by noting that the First Amendment in student speech cases must be applied in
light of the special circumstances of the school environment.44
The Court stated that under the special circumstances of the school
environment, if a school cannot ﬁnd that the forbidden conduct would “materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school” the prohibition cannot be sustained.45 This standard
requires school ofﬁcials to show “more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness” that comes with an unpopular opinion.46 Tinker also requires
more than an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.47
The Court found school authorities had no reason to believe students wearing
black armbands would substantially interfere with the classroom or impinge on
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. John Tinker was ﬁfteen years old, Christopher Eckhardt was sixteen
years old, and Mary Beth Tinker was thirteen years old. Id.
41

Id.

42

Id. at 514.

43

Id. at 506.

44

Id.

45

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).

46

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. In Tinker, the Court said the school ofﬁcials’ concern that if students
wore the armbands, other students might ridicule them or argue with them was no more than a
desire to avoid an unpleasant situation. Id.
47
Id. at 508. The Court also held that the school ofﬁcials’ fear that the armbands might cause
conﬂict between the students was only an undifferentiated fear of apprehension. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss1/10

4

Nelson: Constitutional Law - The Supreme Court Takes a Fractured Stance o

CASE NOTE

2008

295

the rights of other students.48 The armbands silently and passively expressed an
opinion, and no evidence existed to show the armbands caused any disturbance.49
Further, the Vietnam War created major political controversy at that time.50
School ofﬁcials, motivated by their desire to avoid the controversy surrounding
the Vietnam War, tried to avoid conﬂict at the cost of student expression.51 The
Court found this denial of expression unacceptable.52
The Court found particular signiﬁcance in the school’s prohibition of black
armbands but not other political or social symbols.53 It interpreted the schools’
prohibition of just one symbol as evidence that the school ofﬁcials’ actions
amounted to the prohibition of one particular viewpoint.54 Absent a substantial
interference with school work or discipline, the Court held this prohibition
unconstitutional.55 Thus under Tinker, freedom of expression exists within public
schools as long as the student does not substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline or violate the rights of others.56

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
The Court heard the second major student speech case, Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser in 1986.57 In that case, Matthew Fraser delivered a speech at a
high school assembly, nominating another student for student elective ofﬁce.58 He
delivered his speech in front of approximately six hundred high school students,
many as young as fourteen, at a school-sponsored assembly as part of an educational
program in self-government.59 In his speech, Fraser used an elaborate, graphic,
and sexually explicit metaphor to describe the candidate he was nominating.60
Before Fraser presented his speech, two of his teachers warned him they
considered the content of his speech inappropriate and he would likely be

48

Id. at 509.

49

Id. at 508.

50

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. The Court also held that a student’s speech rights apply not only
in the classroom, but also in the cafeteria, on the playing ﬁeld, or anywhere on campus. Id. at
512-13.
56

Id. at 512-13.

57

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 677-78.
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punished.61 Despite these warnings, Fraser presented his remarks as planned.62
The day after the speech, the assistant principal called Fraser to her ofﬁce.63
The assistant principal informed Fraser of Bethel High School’s disciplinary
rule, which prohibited conduct that interfered with the educational process,
including obscene or profane language or gestures.64 The assistant principal told
Fraser she considered his speech a violation of that rule.65 The assistant principal
suspended Fraser for three days and removed his name from the list of students
to be considered for a graduation speaker.66 The school district upheld Fraser’s
punishment by ﬁnding his speech plainly offensive.67 After Fraser served two days
of his suspension, the school permitted Fraser to return to school.68
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit both found that the
assistant principal violated Fraser’s free speech rights under the Tinker standard.69
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on several grounds.70 The Court
began by explaining that although students have a constitutional right to free
expression while at school, students must also learn the boundaries of socially
acceptable behavior in school.71 As such, schools are not required to grant students
the same latitude in expressing their opinions as government ofﬁcials would have
to grant adults for the same expressions.72 Thus, “the constitutional rights of
students in public schools are not automatically co-extensive with the rights of
adults in other settings.”73
The Court went on to hold that school ofﬁcials could punish lewd and
offensive speech.74 Focusing on the public schools’ role in protecting young
students from offensive and vulgar language, the Court explained that offensive
speech did not warrant the same level of protection as other forms of speech.75 It
61

Id. at 678.

62

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678-79.

68

Id. at 679. The school allowed Fraser to speak at graduation. Id.

69

Id. at 679-80.

70

Id. at 680.

71

Id. at 681. The Court stated “that right must be balanced against the society’s countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” Id.
72

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 683.

75

Id. at 684.
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referenced Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire stating that such offensive speech did not
contribute to the exchange of ideas and had very little value in ﬁnding truth.76
The Court distinguished Fraser from Tinker by explaining the penalty
imposed on Fraser was unrelated to any particular viewpoint.77 Fraser, the Court
noted, did not follow the rule set out in Tinker.78 As long as the speech is offensive
or obscene, under Fraser, the school can censor the speech even if the school
cannot show any actual or substantial disruption, as required by Tinker.79

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
The third case in the Tinker trilogy is Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.80
In that case, Hazelwood East High School, through its Journalism II class published
a school paper entitled Spectrum approximately every three weeks.81 The Board of
Education bore the majority of the ﬁnancial responsibility for Spectrum.82 The
normal practice at Hazelwood East High was for the Journalism II teacher to
present a copy of the paper to the principal, Robert Reynolds, for review prior to
publication.83
Three days prior to the scheduled publication, the Journalism II teacher
submitted a copy of the May 13th edition of Spectrum for Principal Reynolds’s
review.84 Reynolds thought the school should not publish two of the stories in
that edition of the school paper.85 One of the stories he objected to discussed
three students’ experiences with pregnancy.86 He worried that even though the
authors withheld the students’ names, the limited number of pregnant students
at Hazelwood East would make the identity of the students in the story easy for
other students to determine.87 The other story he found objectionable discussed
the impact of divorce on the Hazelwood East students.88 The article contained
76

Id. at 684. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). The
Chaplinsky Court stated, “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any beneﬁt that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
77

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.

78

See id.

79

See id. at 685.

80

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 263.

84

Id.

85

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.
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some negative remarks about one student’s parents.89 Principal Reynolds expressed
concern that the parents did not have a fair opportunity to respond to such
remarks.90
Due to Principal Reynolds’s concerns, the Journalism II class published
Spectrum without the two pages containing the stories to which the principal
objected.91 The class did not print the other articles that would have been on the
pages with the objectionable articles.92 Principal Reynolds explained there was
not enough time to make the necessary changes before the scheduled publication
date, and delayed publication would result in publication after the end of the
school year.93
Three students in Hazelwood East’s Journalism II class ﬁled suit in United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging that the school
violated their First Amendment rights.94 The district court found no violation
had occurred.95 The district court held “school ofﬁcials may impose restraints on
students’ speech in activities that are ‘an integral part of the school’s educational
function,’. . . so long as their decision has a ‘substantial and reasonable basis.’”96
Relying on Tinker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and found that Spectrum amounted to a public forum, and thus deserved
increased protection.97
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision.98
The Court relied on Tinker and Fraser, stating that although students do not shed
their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, those rights are not necessarily
the same rights as those possessed by adults.99 The Court determined that
Spectrum did not amount to a public forum because school ofﬁcials did not show
any intention to open its pages to “indiscriminate use” by student reporters and
editors.100 Rather, Spectrum was part of the Journalism II curriculum, overseen by
teachers and school administrators.101 Since the Court did not consider Spectrum
89

Id.

90

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263.

91

Id. at 264.

92

Id.

93

Id. at 263-64.

94

Id. at 264.

95

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 264.

96

Id. at 264.

97

Id. at 265.

98

Id. at 266.

99

Id.

100

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270.

101

Id. at 268-70.
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a public forum, the Court held “school ofﬁcials were entitled to regulate the
content of Spectrum in any reasonable manner.”102
In this case, the Court distinguished between tolerating particular student
speech and afﬁrmatively promoting that same speech.103 When students, parents,
and members of the community could reasonably perceive that activities such
as school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and expressive activities
are sponsored or promoted by the school, educators have more authority.104 Even
if such activities do not take place in the classroom, they may be considered part
of the school’s curriculum.105 As such, school authorities can exercise control
over such activities to ensure students learn the lessons the activity is designed
to teach.106 The school can also “disassociate” itself from speech, even if it is
not disruptive or offensive.107 The Court speciﬁcally held, “[a] school must also
retain authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order.’”108 Thus the Tinker
trilogy established that students possessed First Amendment rights subject to
restriction if the expression created a substantial disruption, was lewd or obscene,
or bore the school’s imprimatur.109

Incitement to Lawless Activity
In addition to student speech, speech that incites lawless action also receives
less protection under the First Amendment than other types of speech.110 The
current test for whether state ofﬁcials can restrict speech that incites lawless action
is found in Brandenburg v. Ohio.111 In that case, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, ﬁned $1,000
and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for speeches he made at KKK rallies.112
In the speeches he expressed racist attitudes and threatened “revengeance.”113
The Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s conviction, holding the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
102

Id. at 270.

103

Id. at 270-71.

104

Id. at 271.

105

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).

109

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.

110

See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

111

Id. at 447.

112

Id. at 445.

113

Id at 446.
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Amendments.114 The Court held a state can only prohibit speech that 1) advocates
the use of force or law violation when such advocacy directly incites or produces
imminent lawless action, and 2) is likely to actually incite or produce such
action.115 This narrow holding does not allow a state to punish mere advocacy of
illegal action.116

Qualiﬁed Immunity
Another issue in the Morse case was qualiﬁed immunity, a doctrine in which
courts grant public ofﬁcials performing discretionary functions qualiﬁed immunity
and “shield them from liability for civil damages [when] their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”117 To determine whether a public ofﬁcial is entitled to
qualiﬁed immunity, courts engage in a two-step inquiry as described in Saucier v.
Katz.118 First, the court must determine if the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation
of a constitutional right, and if so, whether that constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.119 A constitutional right is “clearly
established,” if it is clear within the speciﬁc context of the case, rather than in
a general sense.120 While there does not have to be a case prohibiting the exact
conduct in question, the right must be “sufﬁciently clear that a reasonable ofﬁcial
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”121
The second step in the qualiﬁed immunity analysis requires the court to
determine whether the public ofﬁcial was objectively reasonable in taking the
particular action in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time
of the action.122 The court does not need to address the second step unless it ﬁrst
ﬁnds the law clearly established.123

114

Id. at 448.

115

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.

116

Id.

117

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982).
118

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.

119

Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.

120

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Saucier, 553 U.S. at 200.

121

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615. The Court also phrased this standard
as “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640;
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.
122

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641; Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.

123

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. This is because “an ofﬁcial could not reasonably be expected
to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade
conduct not previously identiﬁed as unlawful.” Id.
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The Court justiﬁed this order-of-battle in Saucier.124 In that case, a demonstrator sued the military police ofﬁcer who arrested him after a protest, alleging the
police ofﬁcer violated numerous rights.125 The police ofﬁcer raised the defense
of qualiﬁed immunity.126 The Supreme Court held that in a qualiﬁed immunity
analysis the Court must consider the constitutional question before determining
whether the ofﬁcial acted reasonably.127 This order-of-battle is justiﬁed, according
to the Court, because it allows constitutional law to develop.128

PRINCIPAL CASE
The decision in Morse v. Frederick consists of ﬁve separate opinions.129 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Alito, Thomas,
and Kennedy.130 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.131 Justice Alito also
wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy.132 Justice Breyer concurred
in part and dissented in part, and Justice Stevens authored the dissent joined by
Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg.133

Chief Justice Roberts, Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two questions: whether
Frederick had a First Amendment right to wield his banner, and whether Principal
Morse was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.134 The Court initially determined

124

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

125

Id. at 198-99.

126

Id. at 199.

127

Id. at 200.

128

Id. at 201.
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the
premises alleged, a court might ﬁnd it necessary to set forth principles which will
become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established. This is the process
for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon
turning to the existence of a constitutional right as the ﬁrst inquiry. The law might
be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question
whether the law clearly established that the ofﬁcer’s conduct was unlawful in the
circumstances of the case.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
129

See generally Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).

130

Id.

131

Id. at 2629 (Thomas, J., concurring).

132

Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).

133

Id. at 2637 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
134

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 10

302

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

Frederick did not have a First Amendment right to waive his banner.135 Therefore,
the Court never had to address the qualiﬁed immunity issue.136

School Speech
The Court quickly rejected Frederick’s argument that this case did not
amount to a school speech case.137 Chief Justice Roberts noted every authority that
addressed the case considered Frederick’s banner student speech.138 The opinion
also explained the facts indicate this amounted to school speech.139 Namely, the
expression occurred during school hours, at an approved school event, supervised
by teachers, while the high school band and cheerleaders performed in uniform.140
The Court also noted that Frederick directed his banner toward the student body,
providing further evidence that the banner constituted student speech.141

Meaning of the Message
Whether the message “BONG HiTs 4 JESUS” promoted illegal drug use
was a hotly contested factual issue.142 The Court began by describing the message
as cryptic.143 The Court reasoned, to some the message could be offensive, while
others may ﬁnd it amusing.144 Still others could believe, as Frederick claimed, the
words meant nothing and were merely nonsense meant to attract the attention of
television cameras.145 Yet, the opinion took none of these views.146
The Court discussed Principal Morse’s interpretation of the message.147 Morse
explained when she saw the banner she thought many people would understand
the term “bong hit” as a reference to smoking marijuana.148 In particular, she
believed the other high school students would interpret “bong hits” in that way.149
135

Id.

136

Id. The Court’s opinion did, however, address Justice Breyer’s contention that the court
should have decided based on qualiﬁed immunity alone in a footnote. Id. at n.1.
137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Compare Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624-25 with Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643-44 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
143

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id. at 2625.

147

Id. at 2624-25.

148

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624-25.

149

Id.
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Thus, Morse viewed the banner as promoting illegal drug use, in violation of
school board policy.150
The Court agreed with Morse’s interpretation of the sign.151 Chief Justice
Roberts claimed “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” could be interpreted two ways.152 First,
the message could be an imperative, as in “[Take] bong hits for Jesus.”153 Second,
it could celebrate marijuana use, as in “bong hits [are a good thing]” or “[we
take] bong hits.”154 The majority then stated that no practical difference existed
between promoting illegal drug use and celebrating it.155 Further, the “paucity of
alternative meanings” made it highly probable the banner promoted marijuana
use.156 The Court rejected Frederick’s alternative interpretation of the banner
as meaningless.157 While ‘meaningless’ was a possible interpretation, dismissing
the banner as meaningless would ignore an undeniable reference to illegal drugs,
according to the Court.158 It refused to consider that Frederick just wanted to
appear on television.159 The majority summarily dismissed any argument that
Frederick’s message constituted political speech.160

Application of the Tinker Trilogy
Chief Justice Roberts discussed previous case law, but determined that the
Court need not follow that case law in its holding.161 The Court cited Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District for the proposition that
students and teachers have First Amendment rights.162 Nevertheless, the Court
went on to distinguish the present case from Tinker.163 The Court determined
the black armbands worn by the students in Tinker constituted political speech,

150

Id. at 2625.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.

159

Id. The Court reasoned getting on television was Frederick’s motive for the creating the
banner and not an interpretation of what the banner said. Id.
160

Id. All the court said regarding political speech was “not even Frederick argues that the
banner conveys any sort of political or religious message,” and “this is plainly not a case about
political debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession.” Id.
161

Id. at 2625-29. “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to students and teachers.” Id.
162

Id. at 2625 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).

163

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625-26.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 10

304

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

while Frederick’s banner did not.164 Political speech, as in Tinker, deserves more
protection than other forms of speech because political speech is “the core of
what the First Amendment aims to protect.”165 The Court also distinguished the
present case from Tinker, because unlike black armbands, Frederick’s fourteenfoot banner was not a passive expression.166
From the second case in the Tinker trilogy, Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, the Court cited two principles.167 First, students do not have the same
extent of free expression rights as adults in other settings.168 The Court stated
if Frederick had unfurled his banner in a public forum outside the school his
expression would be protected.169 Second, the Court used Fraser to illustrate that
the analysis in Tinker is not absolute.170 The Court reasoned whatever analysis
the Fraser Court used, it did not follow the material disruption standard from
Tinker.171
In its discussion of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court quoted,
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activities so long
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”172 The
Court concluded since no reasonable person would reasonably believe Frederick’s
banner was promoted by the school, Kuhlmeier did not control as precedent.173
Nevertheless, the Court did ﬁnd Kuhlmeier instructive because Kuhlmeier
acknowledged public schools’ ability to regulate some speech “even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”174

Important Interest
The Court next addressed the importance of deterring drug use by school
children.175 The Court stated that deterring drug use among school children is
164

Id. at 2626.

165

Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).

166

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.

167

Id.

168

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682). “The rights of students in public
schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” Fraser, 487
U.S. at 682.
169

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.

170

Id. at 2627.

171

Id.

172

Id. (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273).

173

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627.

174

Id. (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266). According to the Court, Kuhlmeier also conﬁrms
that Tinker is not the only analysis the Supreme Court can use in student speech cases. Id. (citing
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 260).
175

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
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an important, and possibly even compelling, interest.176 The Court also found
that drug use among young people has become an even larger problem in the past
twelve years.177 The Court cited statistics and referred to Congressional spending
to support the contention that drug use among teens in the United States remains
a serious problem.178 In particular, Congress provided billions of dollars for school
drug-prevention programs, requiring that schools receiving such funds convey a
clear message to students that illegal drugs use is wrong and harmful.179 According
to the Court, this showed Congress deemed teen drug use a serious problem.180
The Court also relied on the thousands of school board policies across the nation
aimed at educating students about the harmful effects of drug use.181 Based on
statistics and congressional and school board policies, the Court determined the
goal of preventing drug use among teens sufﬁciently justiﬁed punishing drug
advocacy in public schools.182
The majority’s emphasis on the importance of preventing teen drug use was
the ﬁnal justiﬁcation for holding that school ofﬁcials could punish students for
messages promoting drug use, thus creating a fourth rule on student speech.

176
Id. (citing Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). To support this
conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts explained many of the negative effects drug use can have on teens
including harm to the nervous system, losses in learning, increased risk of chemical dependence, and
a low recovery rate. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing Veronia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 661-62).
The Court then stated that student drug use affects a school’s entire student body because even one
student taking drugs can harm a learning environment. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing Veronia
School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 661-62).
177
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing Bd. of Edu. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pattawatomie
Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834, n.5 (2002)). The Court determined that the drug problem has
gotten worse since the Court decided Earls in 2002. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628. In Earls, the Court
found that the drug use problem among teens had grown worse since 1995. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834,
n.5.
178
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing 1 National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes
of Health, Monitoring the Future: National Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975-2005 Secondary School
Students, 99, 101 (2006)). The Court noted that about half of American twelfth graders, one-third
of tenth graders, and one-ﬁfth of eighth graders have used an illicit drug. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
It also recognized that nearly one in four twelfth graders has used an illicit drug in the past month.
Id. The court also noted that 25% of high school students say they have been offered, sold, or
given an illegal drug on school property in the last year. Id. (citing DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCEUNITES STATES, 2005, 55 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES,
NO. SS-5, P. 19 (June 9, 2006)).
179
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2728 (citing Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of
1994, 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV)).
180

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2728.

181

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2728. The Court suggested that one reason so many school boards have
such policies is that they understand the power of peer pressure in inﬂuencing teens to consume
illegal substances. Id. (citing Bd. of Edu. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pattawatomie Cty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
182

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
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The Court’s determination that Frederick’s banner was unfurled at school and
that “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” promotes drug use caused the Court to hold that
Frederick’s banner was unprotected.

Justice Thomas, Concurring
Justice Thomas agreed schools should be allowed to prohibit student speech
advocating illegal drug use, however, he also argued the Constitution allows
schools to prohibit any and all student speech.183 Justice Thomas stated that the
ruling in Tinker had no basis in the Constitution.184 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Thomas relied on the history of U.S. public education.185 He also relied on
the doctrine of in loco parentis, which gave schools power to discipline and teach
children similar to parental power.186 Justice Thomas claimed that by granting
students First Amendment rights, Tinker ignored the in loco parentis doctrine and
undermined teachers’ authority to maintain order in public schools.187

Justice Alito, With Whom Justice Kennedy Joined, Concurring
Although Justices Alito and Kennedy concurred in the Court’s opinion, they
wrote separately to clarify that any further restrictions on student speech based
on precedent formed by this decision would be unacceptable.188 Justice Alito’s
concurrence even stated it regards this regulation as “standing at the far reaches
of what the First Amendment permits.”189 While this concurrence agreed with
the Court that student speech rights are limited, it argued there are no further
grounds for regulation that this Court has not already recognized in Tinker, Fraser,
Kuhlmier, and now Morse.190
183

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).

184

Id. at 2630-31 (Thomas, J., concurring).

185

Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas explained that early public schools
instilled a “core of common values in students and taught them self-control.” Id. at 2630 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citing A. POTTER & G. EMERSON, THE SCHOOL AND THE SCHOOLMASTER: A MANUAL
125 (1843)). Teachers taught, and students listened. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring). Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
186

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring).

187

Id. at 2631-35 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas did not accept the argument that
today’s public schools should not treat children as if they were still in the nineteenth century. Id. at
2635 (Thomas, J., concurring). Rather, he suggested that parents who want their children to have
freedom of speech can send their children to private school or work through the political process
with local school boards. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
188

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).

189

Id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).

190

Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s concurrence made an effort to combat
one argument made by Morse that the Court’s opinion did not address. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Morse argued Tinker would allow school ofﬁcials to prohibit speech that interferes with a school’s
educational mission. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). The concurrence reasoned this would be much too
broad, and allow school boards to deﬁne the school’s ‘educational mission’ of the school in terms of
the political and social views of that group. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
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Justice Alito also emphasized that schools are organs of the State, and they do
not stand in the shoes of parents.191 Rather, the special characteristics of the school
environment often pose special dangers because parents do not have the ability
to protect their children while they attend school.192 Justice Alito went on to
argue that speech advocating the use of illegal drugs is one of the special dangers
posed by the school environment.193 As such, the concurrence agreed schools can
prohibit speech advocating illegal drug use.194

Justice Breyer, Concurring in the Judgment in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Breyer argued the Court should have ruled solely on the grounds
of qualiﬁed immunity, by ﬁnding Principal Morse’s conduct reasonable.195
Justice Breyer worried the Morse ruling could authorize further viewpoint-based
restrictions on speech.196 He also pointed out the Court produced several differing
opinions, only confusing the area of law.197 Whereas, if the Court decided the
case solely on qualiﬁed immunity grounds, the decision would have likely been
unanimous.198 He argued that making a constitutional ruling was unnecessary
and violated the principle of judicial restraint.199

Justice Stevens, With Whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg Joined,
Dissenting
The dissent agreed that Principal Morse should not be personally liable for
restricting Frederick’s speech, but the agreement ended there.200 The interpretation

191

Id. (Alito, J., concurring). This argument speciﬁcally addressed Justice Thomas’s contention
that schools stand in loco parentis and thus have unlimited authority to discipline school children.
See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629-36 (Thomas, J., concurring).
192
Id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s concurrence also pointed out that public
school is the only option for many parents. Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).
193

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628. (Alito, J., concurring).

194

Id. (Alito, J., concurring).

195

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Breyer also argued that lower courts should be able to determine whether a public ofﬁcial is entitled
to qualiﬁed immunity before determining whether the actions of the public ofﬁcial violated the
constitution. Id. at 2642 (Breyer, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196

Id. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

197

Id. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

198

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

199

Id. at 2639-42 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The doctrine of
judicial restraint posits that when possible, the federal courts should avoid ruling on constitutional
issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
200

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting.).
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of the facts sparked a strong disagreement between the dissent and the majority.201
Unlike the majority, the dissent found it relevant that Frederick did not have any
particular desire to spread the pro-drug message.202 Rather, he claimed he only
wanted to be on television.203 The dissent also found Frederick’s message did not
advocate the use of illegal drugs.204 At best, the banner proclaimed a nonsense
message that mentioned drugs.205 The dissent, therefore, would have decided the
case on much narrower grounds, ﬁnding Principal Morse justiﬁed in removing the
fourteen-foot banner based on concern about nationwide evaluation of student
conduct at Juneau-Douglas High School.206
The dissent also disagreed with the Court’s application of the Tinker trilogy
to this case.207 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated that Tinker stood for
two basic First Amendment principles that the Court ignored in its ruling.208 First,
the Court ordinarily presumes censorship based on the speech’s content, and more
particularly the speech’s viewpoint, is unconstitutional.209 The dissent declared
that the Court sanctioned stark viewpoint discrimination in this decision.210 The
dissent reasoned this was inappropriate because the First Amendment protects
against government interference with the expression of unpopular ideas.211
Second, the dissent asserted that punishing advocacy of illegal conduct is
only constitutional when that advocacy is actually likely to provoke such harm.212
201

Compare Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling the majority’s
interpretation “feeble” and stating that the majority’s interpretation required “real imagination”)
with Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624-25 (ﬁnding that Frederick’s banner can only be interpreted as
advocacy or celebration of drug use).
202

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

203

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

204

Id. at 2643-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

205

Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

206

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that Morse’s concern about the evaluation of
student conduct would have justiﬁed removal even if the banner had said something as benign as
“Glaciers Melt.” Id. (Stevens J., dissenting).
207

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

208

Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

209

Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenburger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819,828-29 (1969)).
210

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

211

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society ﬁnds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable”)).
212
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449
(holding a state can only prohibit speech that advocates the use of force or law violation when such
advocacy directly incites or produces imminent lawless action, and is likely to actually incite or
produce such action)).
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Advocating illegal drug use is far from “incitement to imminent lawless action,”
the standard established by Brandenburg v. Ohio.213 Even though the dissent
agreed on the importance of preventing teenage drug use, it asserted the high
school must show Frederick’s supposed advocacy stood a meaningful chance of
making other students try marijuana.214 The dissent asserted that Morse could not
show a meaningful chance of inducing other students to try marijuana existed in
this case.215
The dissent argued that in the First Amendment context, any tie should be
resolved in the speaker’s favor.216 The policy behind such a standard aims to prevent
the fears of a political majority from silencing the view of a political minority.217
The dissent worried that school administrators would use this decision to silence
opposition to the “war on drugs.”218

ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Morse v. Frederick is problematic for
several reasons.219 First, rather than clarify student speech law, the multitude of
opinions and the creation of a fourth rule make student speech law even more
confusing.220 Second, the Court’s ruling allows viewpoint-based discrimination,
213

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
Relying on Tinker, the dissent asserted prohibiting a certain kind of speech, even in a school setting,
requires more than a remote fear of apprehension of a disturbance. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
214

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

215

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use drugs) are dumb.
Most students, however, do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most
students know dumb advocacy when they see it. The notion that the message on this
banner would persuade the average student, or even the dumbest one, to change his
or her behavior is implausible.

Id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007)).
217

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

218

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) The dissent analogizes current debate over the wisdom of the so
called war on drugs with the debate surrounding prohibition. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). It argued
that this nation’s experience with alcohol should make the Court cautious with restrictions on
speech regarding marijuana. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted the Court’s ruling
did not differentiate between types of drugs, speciﬁcally alcohol. Id. at 2650 (Stevens J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens hypothesized that if Frederick’s banner had instead said “WINE SiPS 4 JESUS,” a
message that could easily be construed either as a religious message or as a pro-alcohol message,
the Court’s ruling would allow school ofﬁcials to punish such a message. Id. at 2650 (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
219

See infra notes 220-65 and accompanying text.

220

See infra notes 223-41 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 10

310

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

which is ordinarily unconstitutional.221 Third, the court’s decision could have a
chilling effect on student speech.222

Morse v. Frederick Further Confuses Student Speech Law
Morse v. Frederick is the ﬁrst student speech case addressed by the Supreme
Court since Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier in 1988.223 As such, this case was widely
anticipated in the hopes that the Court would ﬁnally clarify what had become
a confusing area of law.224 The Supreme Court, however, dashed those hopes
by making student speech law even more confusing than it was prior to this
decision.225 The Court’s opinion made student speech law more confusing by 1)
creating a new rule, rather than clarifying precedent, 2) relying on an ambiguous
factual situation to create the new rule, and 3) issuing ﬁve separate opinions.226
Rather than rely on the precedent set by the Tinker trilogy, the Court further
confused the law by adding a fourth condition under which schools can prohibit
student speech.227 Chief Justice Roberts, in the Court’s opinion, stated, “the
special characteristics of the school environment, and the governmental interest
in stopping student drug abuse—reﬂected in the policies of Congress and myriad
school boards, including JDHS—allow schools to restrict student expression that
they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”228 This new rule does not
clarify when student expression is sufﬁciently disruptive or whether school ofﬁcials
can curtail expression that conﬂicts with the school’s mission in the absence of

221

See infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text.

222

See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.

223

See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2618.

224

See Martha McCarty, Ph.D., Student Expression Rights: Is a New Standard on the Horizon?,
216 ED. LAW REP. 15, 27 (2007). Dr. McCarty argues that student speech rights were not clear. Id.
(citing Guiles v. Marrineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing the “unsettled waters
of free speech rights in public schools”) and Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging that much of the law on student expression is “difﬁcult to understand and apply”)).
Dr. McCarty also claims that, “[c]lariﬁcation is needed as to when student expression has to be
disruptive to be censored and whether expression that conﬂicts with the school’s mission can be
curtailed in the absence of a threat of disruption.” Id. at 30.
See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, A Narrow Win for Schools, 29 NAT’L L.J. No.
49 (2007) (stating neither administrators nor student come out of this decision with a greater
understanding of the broader issue of how much protection student speech deserves).
225

226

See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (creating a fourth rule about student speech and issuing ﬁve
separate opinions); Murad Hussain, The “BONG” Show: Viewing Frederick’s Publicity Stunt Through
Kuhlmeier’s Lens, 116 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 292, 300 (2007) (arguing that the Court should not
shape student speech law based on such an idiosyncratic fact situation).
227
See Calvert & Richards, supra note 225 (arguing the Court’s decision does not “advance,
overrule, diminish or even substantially tweak” any earlier precedent).
228

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
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disruption, as many had hoped it would.229 It merely added a fourth rule for
administrators to consider: whether the student’s expression could reasonably be
interpreted as promoting illegal drug use.230
The facts of this case and the ambiguous nature of the message amplify the
confusion created by adding a fourth rule.231 Great debate ensued over whether
the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” even amounted to drug-use advocacy.232
Chief Justice Roberts, in the Court’s opinion, added his own words to Frederick’s
banner to come to the conclusion that the message constituted either an
incitement to use drugs or a celebration of drug use.233 Thus, the extent to which
school administrators can add their own interpretation to a student’s speech to
create a pro-drug message remains unclear.234 The Court also stated no practical
difference exists between the celebration of drugs and the promotion of drug-use,
leaving which activities are close enough to the advocacy of drug use to warrant
suppression also unclear.235 As such, this opinion may cause teachers, school
administrators, and students great confusion as to which messages involving drugs
can be proscribed as “advocacy” and which messages cannot.236
Finally, the Morse decision confuses student speech law by issuing ﬁve different
opinions and rationales.237 Although ﬁve Justices agreed with the Court’s opinion,
they clearly had different reasons for doing so, as demonstrated by the abundant
concurrences.238 The existence of ﬁve opinions and vastly differing rationales gives
very confusing guidance to the teachers and school administrators who have the

229
See McCarthy, supra note 224, at 30 (expressing hope that the Court would clarify student
speech law); Calvert & Richards, supra note 225.
230

Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.

231

See Posting of David French (Senior Legal Counsel at the Alliance Defense Fund and
the Director of its Center for Academic Freedom) phibetacons.nationalreview.com <click on
archives><June 2007><A Bong Hit to Free Speech> (June 25, 2007, 12:19 EST) (arguing that in
Morse, “bad facts make bad law”); Hussain, supra note 226 (stating “it would be unfortunate if the
Court broadly reshapes the contours of intra-school discourse with an idiosyncratic case in which
the student was not trying to speak to anyone at school”).
232

Compare Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624-25 with Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2643-44 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
233

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625. See supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.

234

See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens J., dissenting).

235

Id. at 2625.

236

See Hussain, supra note 226; Perry A. Zirkel, The Supreme Court Speaks on Student Expression:
A Revised Map, 221 ED. LAW REP. 485, 491 (2007). “In the meanwhile, pending further Supreme
Court speech on student expression, caution is warranted in these grey, unsettled areas, particularly
in, but not limited to, jurisdictions without pertinent lower court decisions. In short, deciphering
content of Morse code beyond pro-drug messages is subject to (mis)interpretation.” Id.
237

See generally Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.

238

Id.
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responsibility of making the day-to-day decisions regarding student speech.239 A
United States District Court opinion issued less than a month after the decision in
Morse recognized that school administrators are justiﬁed in their confusion about
the boundaries of student speech.240 Thus, rather than clarify student speech law,
the Court only made it more confusing through the Morse decision.241

Morse Allows Viewpoint-Based Discrimination.
The Supreme Court’s decision not only utterly confused student speech law,
but more importantly it essentially condoned viewpoint-based discrimination.242
In First Amendment cases, content-based, and especially viewpoint-based
prohibitions, are subject to the most stringent standards.243 The Court generally
presumes viewpoint-based discrimination unconstitutional.244 The reasoning
behind this presumption relates to a major justiﬁcation of the First Amendment
itself: the least popular political views need the most protection for democracy to
function.245
This reasoning applies equally to the school environment.246 Since public
schools are a primary vehicle of social and civic learning in our society, the
infringement of rights in schools while students are at an impressionable age is

239

See Calvert & Richards, supra note 225; Margaret Graham Tebo, High Court Hits “BONG,”
6 No. 26 ABA J. E-Report 1 (June, 29 2007) (“Noting the close vote and variety of opinions
expressed by the justices . . . the case provides little value as precedent. There was nothing close to
consensus here”). Justice Breyer argued that it was “utterly unnecessary” to produce ﬁve differing
opinions in this case. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2641 (Breyer J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
240

Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 496 F.Supp.2d 587, 604 (2007). “The ﬁve separate
opinions in Morse illustrate the plethora of approaches that may be taken in this murky area of law.”
Id.
241

See supra notes 218-36 and accompanying text.

242

See Hans Bader, Campaign Finance Reform and Free Speech: Bong HiTS for Jesus: The First
Amendment Takes a Hit, 2006-07 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 133, 142 (2007) (stating that the decision in
Morse was disappointing because it permitted “viewpoint discrimination and censorship based on
speculation about the consequences of speech”).
243
See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995); See
generally City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
244

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828.

245

Id.

246

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,
(rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.

Id. (citing Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)(internal citations omitted)).
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detrimental.247 If students do not learn about their constitutional rights early, they
will not be as willing to exercise those rights in the future.248
In creating a restriction that prohibits students from expressing possible views
concerning drugs, the Court has taken the increased First Amendment ﬂexibility
granted ‘in light of the special circumstances’ of public schools too far.249 Although
preventing student drug use may be an important objective of public schools, that
concern does not raise it above constitutional grounds.250 In effect, the Supreme
Court raised the “war on drugs,” a highly controversial political topic, to a level
equal with the First Amendment, and gave the “war on drugs” equal footing with
constitutional guarantees.251
Morse may pave the way for further speech restrictions.252 Perhaps colleges
and universities will adopt the Morse rationale and prohibit drug-related messages
on campuses.253 If the Court deems preventing drug use among teens a sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation to pass constitutional scrutiny in schools, it is likely other justiﬁcations
for censorship will also pass constitutional scrutiny.254 Student speech regarding
alcohol, sex, and violence may be on the path to restriction.255

247

See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating public
education “is the very foundation of good citizenship,” and “is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values”).
248

See Hussain, supra note 226.

249

Id. (arguing that permitting broader content regulation is likely to have a chilling effect on
student speech).
250
See Bader, supra note 242. “The idea that viewpoints can be restricted when they oppose
or undercut important government policies is fundamentally at odds with the purpose of the First
Amendment.” Id.; see also Posting of French, supra note 231 (arguing that virtually all restrictions
on speech are justiﬁed by preventing harm to young people and by referencing other laws and
regulations, and that the same justiﬁcations could be used to silence virtually any speech, including
speech on political and religious issues).
251

See Bader, supra note 242.

252

See ACLU Slams Supreme Court Decision in Student Free Speech Case, http://www.aclu.
org/scotus/2006term/morsev.frederick/30230prs20070625.html (“because the decision is based on
the Court’s view about the value of speech concerning drugs, it is difﬁcult to know what its impact
will be in other cases involving unpopular speech”).
253
See Posting of French, supra note 231 (asserting, “[w]hen high school rights shrink,
universities grow bolder”).
254
See Zirkel, supra note 236 at 488 (arguing that the Supreme Court may also subject
expression supportive of alcohol, sex, and violence to censorship in public schools); see also Bader,
supra note 242, at 142.
255

Zirkel, supra note 236; Bader, supra note 242, at 142.
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Morse May Have a Chilling Effect on Student Speech
The danger of the confusing Morse decision is its potential to lead school
ofﬁcials to prohibit any message in which drugs form the content.256 Schools
may become more apt to censor drug related speech, even if the message contains
political or social commentary in ways that Frederick’s message did not.257 Even if
school ofﬁcials do not punish protected speech regarding drugs this decision may
create a chilling effect on students.258 Increasing the possibility of punishment
for drug-advocacy may encourage students to steer far clear of any speech about
drugs, even constitutionally protected speech, out of fear of punishment.259 A
chilling effect is particularly likely since the Court did not attempt to clarify that
political or social speech is protected, despite Justice Alito’s attempt to make the
limits on this ruling clear.260

Qualiﬁed Immunity
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari based partially on qualiﬁed
immunity, which performed a major role in the lower courts’ decisions, the
Supreme Court virtually ignored qualiﬁed immunity by stating since Morse did
not violate Frederick’s constitutional rights, the Court did not need to consider
the second issue of whether Morse was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.261 Justice
Breyer argued that the Court erred by ruling on the constitutional issue rather
than limiting its review to qualiﬁed immunity.262 Justice Breyer asserted that the
principle of judicial restraint prohibited the Court from considering a question of
constitutionality when it can decide a non-constitutional question.263 In this case,
Justice Breyer concluded the Court could have unanimously decided that Morse
was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity without addressing the merits of Frederick’s
claim, and thus should have done so.264

256

See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

257

See id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating, “that the Court believes such a silly message
can be proscribed as advocacy underscores the novelty of its position, and suggests that the principal
it articulates has no stopping point”).
258

See id. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hussain, supra note 226.

259

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “If Frederick’s stupid reference to
marijuana can in the Court’s view justify censorship, then high school students everywhere could
be forgiven for zipping their mouths about drugs at school lest some reasonable observer censor and
punish them for promoting drugs.” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260

See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).

261

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.

262

Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

263

Id. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

264

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Court rightfully rejected Justice Breyer’s argument for two reasons.265
First, the two-step qualiﬁed immunity test the Supreme Court announced in
Saucier requires the Court to determine the constitutional issue before determining
whether a public ofﬁcial qualiﬁes for qualiﬁed immunity.266 Second, if the Court
found Principal Morse was covered by qualiﬁed immunity, it would only eliminate
Frederick’s claim for damages.267 Such a ruling would not address Frederick’s claim
for injunctive relief.268
The Court addressed the First Amendment issue ﬁrst because that is the
ﬁrst step speciﬁcally described by the controlling precedent, Saucier.269 Although
Justice Breyer has urged the court to overrule the Saucier order many times, the
Court has never adopted his view.270 On policy grounds, the Saucier order of
considering the constitutional question allows constitutional law to develop.271
Under the test as Justice Breyer urges, courts could consistently hold public
ofﬁcials are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity because the law was unclear without
addressing the constitutional merits.272 Since so many constitutional cases involve
public ofﬁcials, important constitutional questions may never be addressed, and

265

See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text.

266

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01.

267

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624 n.1.

268

Id.

269

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

270

See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780-81 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring); Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer concurred in these
cases to argue that the Saucier order-of-battle should be overturned. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780-81
(Breyer, J., concurring); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201-02 (Breyer, J., concurring). He argued that the
order-of-battle sometimes requires lower courts to unnecessarily consider constitutional questions,
and that such inquiries often lead to a waste in judicial resources. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780-81
(Breyer, J., concurring); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201-02 (Breyer, J., concurring). As such, Justice
Breyer contended the Court should not have followed the principal of stare decisis in this instance,
and the Supreme Court should have overruled Saucier, allowing courts to choose the order of review
on a case-by-case basis. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780-81 (Breyer, J., concurring); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at
201-02 (Breyer, J., concurring).
271

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

272

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the
premises alleged, a court might ﬁnd it necessary to set forth principles which will
become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established. This is the process
for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon
turning to the existence of a constitutional right as the ﬁrst inquiry. The law might
be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question
whether the law clearly established that the ofﬁcer’s conduct was unlawful in the
circumstances of the case.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4.
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in many cases government agencies may escape review of their actions.273 In
light of this policy, the Court was reasonable in following precedent rather than
addressing qualiﬁed immunity before the constitutional question.274
The second reason the Court could not dispose of this case by simply
claiming Morse was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity without addressing the
constitutionality of her actions was that Frederick requested injunctive relief
regarding his suspension.275 A holding in favor of Morse on qualiﬁed immunity
grounds alone would prevent Frederick from recovering damages.276 However,
it would not address his claims for injunctive relief.277 Although Justice Breyer
hypothesizes that Frederick’s suspension might be completely justiﬁed on nonspeech-related grounds, the Court points out that none of the lower courts
considered that possibility and none of the parties alleged it.278 The Court further
asserted the record supports the opposite conclusion, that Frederick’s suspension
was based at least in part on his speech.279 Based on these two reasons, the Court
rightly concluded disregarding the Saucier order-of-battle and deciding based
on qualiﬁed immunity alone was not the quick and easy answer Justice Breyer
suggested it was.280

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court created a fourth justiﬁcation for suppressing student
speech by ruling that school ofﬁcials can take steps to safeguard students from
speech that can reasonably be interpreted as encouraging illegal drug use.281
Rather than rely on existing precedent the Court now requires school ofﬁcials to
consider a new rule.282 This holding, unlike previous student speech law allows
for the restriction of a speciﬁc viewpoint which may lead to further restrictions
of speech in the future and may discourage students from exercising their First
Amendment rights. 283

273

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; See also Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4.

274

See Saucier, 533. U.S. at 201.

275

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623, 2624 n.1.

276

Id. at 2624 n.1.

277

Id.

278

Id.

279

Id.

280

See supra notes 261-79 and accompanying text.

281

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.

282

See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.

283

See supra notes 242-60 and accompanying text.
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